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Abstract 
System z+ [Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1991, 
Goldszmidt, 1992] is a formalism for reason­
ing with normality defaults of the form "typ­
ically if 'f' then 1/; (with strength .5)" where 
{j is a positive integer. The system has 
a critical shortcoming in that it does not 
sanction inheritance across exceptional sub­
classes. In this paper we propose an exten­
sion to System z+ that rectifies this short­
coming by extracting additional conditions 
between worlds from the defaults database. 
We show that the additional constraints do 
not change the notion of the consistency of 
a database. We also make comparisons with 
competing default reasoning systems. 
1 Introduction 
Goldszmidt's system z+ [Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1991, 
Goldszmidt, 1992] is a formalism for reasoning with 
normality defaults of the form "typically if cp then 1/; 
(with strength o)" where 0 is a non-negative integer. 
The system is attractive because it has been shown 
to be semi-tractable [Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1992] in 
that it is tractable for every sublanguage in which 
propositional satisfiability is tractable. There is how­
ever a critical shortcoming with z+ when compared 
to competing accounts like conditional entailment 
[Geffner, 1989], system z• [Goldszmidt et aL, 1990, 
Goldszmidt, 1992] (maximum entropy) and co• 
[Boutilier, 1992] (when augmented with Brewka's pre­
ferred subtheories [Brewka, 1989]). z+ does not sanc­
tion inheritance across exceptional subclasses. For ex­
ample, consider a defaults database � containing the 
normality defaults "typically birds fly" b -+ J, "pen­
guins typically do not fly" p -+ -.f, "penguins typically 
are birds" p -+ b and "birds typically have wings" 
b -+ w. z+ will conclude that penguins do not fly, 
and once penguins have been determined to be excep­
tional birds with respect to flying, penguins will be 
considered as being exceptional birds with respect to 
all properties. In particular z+ will not be able to 
conclude that penguins have wings, a conclusion that 
we would like to draw from �. 
In this paper we propose a refinement to system z+ 
to rectify this shortcoming. z+ assigns to each world 
an integral belief rank that represents the believability 
of the world and interprets each normality default as 
a constraint on the belief ranks. In addition to the 
z+ constraints, we impose new conditions called cp­
conditions that ensures the following (whenever possi­
ble): every world that is inconsistent with a normal­
ity default to be ranked higher (less believable) than 
a world that is consistent with the default when the 
worlds agree ceteris paribum on all the other normality 
defaults in the database. We will consider the penguin 
example to illustrate how penguins, despite being ex­
ceptional birds with respect to flying, can inherit other 
properties of typical birds. We will also show that cp­
consistency in this stronger system turns out to be no 
different from the original idea of consistency in sys­
tem z+. This implies that the procedure for testing 
consistency presented in [Goldszmidt, 1992] may also 
be used to test for cp-consistency. Thus the complex­
ity of deciding cp-consistency is no worse than that of 
propositional satisfiability and is tractable for useful 
sublanguages like Horn clauses. 
In section 2 we describe system z+ and the constraints 
it imposes on the belief rankings. In section 3 we in­
troduce the notions of cp-conditions, cp-admissibility 
and cp-consistency. We will prove the equivalence of 
cp-consistency and consistency in system z+ and also 
define the K belief ranking which embodies the assump­
tion of maximal ignorance. A number of related sys­
tems are compared in section 4 before we conclude 
with a summary of the paper. 
2 System z+ 
System z+ considers normality defaults of the form 
"typically, if 'P then '1/J (with strength 6)" where t5 is 
a non-negative integer and written 'P .!... 1/;. A nor­
mality default with an unspecified t5 will be assumed 
to have a strength of 0. Normality defaults are in­
terpreted as constraints on the believability (or belief 
554 Tan 
rank) of worlds. A belief rank of 0 indicates that the 
world is believable and higher ranks represent higher 
degrees of abnormality (or surprise), that is decreasing 
believability. 
Given a normality default d = r.p .!..,. 1/J and a world w 
we say that w verifies d if w f= r.p 1\ 1/J. w falsifies d if 
w f= r.p 1\ -.'ljJ and w satisfies d if w f= r.p :J 1/;. We also 
say that the worlds w and v agree (ceteris paribum) 
on d if 
1. w verifies d if and only if v verifies d, and 
2. w falsifies d if and only if v falsifies d. 
The default dis tolerated by a set of normality defaults 
S if the wff r.p 1\ if; A r.p; :J 1/;; is satisfiable (where i 
ranges over all rules in S). 
Definition 1 (Belief Ranking) A belief ranking 
,.; is a non-negative integer-valued function on the set 
of worlds 0 such that ,.;(w) = 0 for some world w E 0. 
Given wffs cp and 1/J, the belief ranking can be extended 
as follows: 
{ :illwl=cp ,.;(w) if r.p is satisfiable 
otherwise. 
{ ,.;(r.p 1\ 1/J)- ��:(r.p) 
00 
if ,.;(r.p) -1- 00 
otherwise. 
A belief ranking ,.; may be considered to be an order­
of-magnitude approximation of a probability function 
P by writing it as a polynomial of some small number 
f and considering only the most significant term in the 
polynomial, 
P(w) � Cf�<(w)_ 
Intuitively, if K reflects our beliefs about worlds ac­
curately then K{ 1/Jir.p) represents the degree of abnor­
mality or surprise associated with discovering 1/J, given 
that we already know r.p, and K('r/J) < ��:(r.p) indicates 
that 1/J is more believable than r.p. 
Definition 2 (Admissibility) Let .:l be a set of nor­
mality defaults. A belief ranking is admissible with 
respect to .:l if and only if 
K(r.p 1\ -.1/J) > K(cp 1\ 1/J) + 6 
for every normality default r.p � 1/J E .:l . .:l is said to 
be consistent if it has an admissible belief ranking. 
Thus a normality default r.p .!..,. 1jJ imposes the con­
straint that given r.p it would be surprising by at least 
8 degrees to find -.!jJ. This reflects the usual inter­
pretation of defaults where 1/J holds in all the minimal 
(preferred or most believed) models for r.p. 
This interpretation of defaults turns out to be too 
weak. The admissibility constraints imposed by a 
normality default r.p ..!... 1jJ constrains only the most 
preferred r.p-worlds, allowing only r.p-worlds that also 
satisfy '1/J to have the same rank as the most pre­
ferred r.p-world. This means that the normality de­
fault has absolutely nothing to say about the ranks 
of the less preferred r.p-worlds. Furthermore in sys­
tem z+ maximal ignorance is assumed and the ,+ 
ranking assigns the lowest possible rank permitted 
by the admissibility constraints. Consequently the 
admissibility constraints become the only constraints 
that are imposed by the normality defaults. This 
leads z+ to fail to sanction inheritance of prop­
erties across exceptional su bel asses; a desirable be­
havior that is present in competing default systems 
like conditional entailment [Geffner, 1989], system 
z• [Goldszmidt et al., 1990, Goldszmidt, 1992] (max­
imum entropy) and co• [Boutilier, 1992]. 
An example will illustrate the problem. Consider the 
defaults database containing the defaults "typically 
birds fly", b--> f and "birds typically have legs", b--> I. 
The ,+ ranking is given by 
+( )-{ 1 ifwf=bl\(-.fV-.l) 
"' 
w - 0 otherwise. 
If we are to discover a bird that does not fly we would 
be unable to conclude that it has legs because ,+ as­
signs the same ranks to w = bfl and v = bfl. Given 
the above defaults, we would prefer to believe in w 
rather than v since 
1. w verifies b --> I, 
2. v falsifies b --> I and 
3. they agree on b--> f. 
This reflects the assumption of maximal independence 
where the additional information about flying is as­
sumed to be irrelevant (unless it is the cause of dis­
agreement with respect to some other defaults in the 
database). This leads us to strengthen the ,+ inter­
pretation of normality defaults. 
3 Ceteris Paribum Admissibility 
Consider the normality default b --> I and the worlds 
w = bf/ and v = bfl. Since w and v differ only in 
their assignment to 1, we will like to be able to infer 
from b --> I that belief in w is preferred to belief in 
v where possible, that is ��:(v) > K(w). However this 
inference may not always be consistent with the rest 
of the defaults database. For example if non-flying 
animals typically do not have legs, -.f --> -./ then we 
may also want to infer K(w) > K(v). However, if two 
worlds, w and v, agree on all the defaults, except for 
those in a set S which are all verified by w but falsified 
by v, then we can safely prefer belief in w over belief 
in v. This motivates the definition of cp-conditions: 
binary relations between worlds that agree on all the 
normality defaults outside of a set whose defaults are 
verified by one world but falsified by the other. 
Definition 3 ( CP Conditions) Let .:l be a set of 
normality defaults and let 8 be the maximum degree of 
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bfl-+--- b fl 
r r 
bfl -+--- b fl 
Figure 1: The cp�conditions of {b ----+ /, b--+ /}. 
the defaults in L1' � �- If worlds w and v are such 
th at w verifies all the defaults in 1:11 and v falsifies all 
the defaults in 1:11 and w and v agree on all the other 
defaults in t1 \ L11 then w >o v is a cp-condition of 
/:1. 
The first theorem tells us that cp�conditions are tran­
sitive. 
Theorem 1 (Transitivity of cp-conditions) If 
w >6' w' and w1 >6" w", then w >o w11 where 
8 = max(8', 811). 
As an illustration cp�conditions, let us consider the de­
faults database, {dt = b--+ /, d2 = b----+ /}. Worlds b fl 
and bfl agree on d2 and disagree on dt while bfl and 
bfl agree on d1 and di�gree on d2. Therefore we have 
cp-conditions bfl < b fl < bfl (with default degrees 
of 0). Similarly bfl < bjl < b fl are cp�conditions. 
Figure 1 shows these cp-conditions, where w --+ v rep­
resents w > v. (Since cp-conditions are transitive, 
bfl < bfl is also a cp�condition.) 
Definition 4 ( CP Admissibility) Let t1 be a set 
of normality defaults. A belief ranking x: is cp­
admissible with respect to t1 if and only if x: is ad­
missible and 
K(w) > x:(v) + 8 
for all cp-conditions w >6 v of 1:1. t1 is cp-consistent 
if there exists a belief ranking that is cp-admissible with 
respect to 1:1. 
The requirement for x: to be admissible (in the z+ 
sense) is not a redundant condition in the sense that 
not all belief rankings that satisfy the cp�conditions 
are admissible. Consider the set t1 = { b ----+ f, p ----+ 
-,f, p --+ b}. The defaults p --+ -,f and p ----+ b are 
satisfied by the worlds bpf and bp]. As for b --+ f, 
it is verified by bpf and falsified by bpf. Therefore 
lffiL < bp[ is a cp�condition of /:1. Also both worlds 
bpf and bpf agree on p --+ b (falsified) and b --+ f 
(satisfied) while disagreeing on p --+ f. So bpf < bpf 
is also a cp-condition of L1. Thus the cp-conditions 
of t1 are bpf < bpf and bpf < bpf; both due to the 
normality default p--+ ..,f. The belief ranking 
( ) _ { 1 if w = bp 1 or w = bp f " w - 0 otherwise 
satisfies both cp-conditions but is not admissible. 
Despite the additional constraints on admissibility, cp­
consistency turns out to be no different from the orig­
inal notion of consistency. This next theorem tells us 
precisely that. 
Theorem 2 (Consistency Equivalence) A set of 
normality defaults t1 is consistent if and only if it is 
cp-consistent. 
In [Goldszmidt, 1992, p. 25], a procedure for testing 
the consistency of a database of normality defaults 
was presented. The equivalence of cp-consistency 
and consistency in z+ implies that the same proce­
dure may be used to check for cp�consistency. The 
complexity of the procedure is O(IL112) satisfiability 
tests on the material counterparts1 of the normal­
ity defaults in t1 [Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1991]. Al­
though the propositional satisfiability problem is NP­
complete; Horn clauses are known to admit tractable 
algorithms [Dowling and Gallier, 1984]. Therefore the 
procedure is tractable for defaults databases that have 
Horn material counterparts. 
Even with the stronger notion of cp-admissibility, a set 
of normality defaults will typically still admit a large 
set of belief rankings. To be able to make stronger con­
clusions, we select a distinguished ranking, in this case 
the K- belief ranking in which we retain the assumption 
of maximal ignorance (as in system z+) and assign ev­
ery world the lowest possible rank. First we observe 
that cp-admissibility is closed under minimization. 
Theorem 3 (Minimization) Let t1 be a set of nor­
mality defaults and let K1 and K2 be two belief rankings. 
If Kt and K2 are cp-admissible then K = min( Kt, 11:2) is 
cp-admissible. 
Definition 5 (Minimal Rankings) Let J{ be a set 
of belief r ankings. K is a minimal ranking in I< if for 
all other rankings x:' E J{ 
K1(w) > K(w) 
for some world w. 
Theorem 3 implies that a set K of cp-admissible be­
lief rankings of .6. has a unique minimal belief ranking 
given by 
K-(w) = min{K(w) IKE K}. 
Thus the K ranking of t1 is the belief ranking that 
assigns the lowest rank to every world among the cp­
admissible rankings of /:1. 
Definition 6 (The K- Ranking) Let t1 be a consis­
tent set of normality defaults. The K, belief ranking is 
a cp-admissible ranking that is minim al in the sense 
that for all worlds w 
K-(w) � K(w) 
for all K th at is cp-admissible with respect to 1:1. 
1The material counterpart of cp � 1/; is the wff cp :) 1/;. 
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Table 1: Comparison between ,.+ and K, rankings. 
Ranks 11:-t- II: 
0 bpf, bpf, bpf bpf, bpf, bpf 
1 bpf, bpf bpf,bpf 
2 bpf, bpf, bpf bpf, bpf 
3 bpf 
Table 2: K, ranking of� U {b � w }. 
Ranks 
0 
1 
2 
3 
Worlds 
bpfw, bpfw, bpfw, bpfw, bp]w 
bpfw, bpfw, bpfW 
bpfw, bpfw, bpfw, bpfw, bpfw 
bpfw, bpfW, bpfW 
As in [Goldszmidt, 1992], each belief ranking R defines 
a consequence relation br where 1/>f;ru if and only if 
��:(u 1\ ¢) < ��:(...,u 1\ ¢)or if��::(¢>)= oo. The basic idea 
is to verify that u holds in all the minimally ranked 
models of¢. 
Let us consider our database � of normality defaults 
{b � f,p � ...,f,p � b} concerning birds, penguins 
and flying. As <!iscussei �bove.l the cp-conditions of 
� are bpf < bpf and bpf < bpf; both due to the 
normality default p � -,f. The ��:+ and K, rankings are 
shown in table 1. We see that the world bpf is forced to 
a higher rank because of the cp-condition bpf < bpf. 
Therefore one conclusion that we can draw from the 
ii ranking is that non-bird penguins do not f!y. This 
conclusion escapes the ��::+ belief ranking as bpf and 
bpf are assigned the same��::+ rank. 
Now if we add the default "birds typically have wings", 
b � w to �. we will obtain the belief ranking shown 
in table 2. The cp-conditions are 
bpfW > bpfw 
bpfw > bpfw 
bpfw > bpfw 
bpfw > bpfw 
bpfw > bpfW 
bpfw > bpfw 
bpfW,bpfw > bpfw,bpfw. 
The first four cp-conditions are due to the default 
b __,. w, the next two are due to b � f while the last set 
is due to p --> ...,f. We note that the minimally ranked 
p-world is bpfw. Therefore, if we are to discover a 
penguin, we would conclude from the K, ranking that 
it is winged non-flying bird. When compared to the 
�;;+ ranking, we see that the default b __,. w imposes 
the cp-condition bpfw > bpfw, thereby admitting the 
additional conclusion. Thus despite being an excep­
tional bird with respect to flying, penguins are still 
Table 3: Status of defaults with respect to bpfw and 
bpfw. 
Default z+priority bpfw bpfw 
b�f 1 N N 
p�-,f 2 F v 
p � b 2 F F 
1 2 v F �w 
V :::: verified, F = falsified and N = neither. 
allowed to inherit the other properties associated with 
its birdness. 
It is uncl�ar at this point in time, if the computation 
of the kappa ranking is computationally more complex 
that the computation of the ��::+ ranking. We do not 
have a procedure for computing the ii ranking from a 
defaults database. 
4 Related Work 
Boutilier [Boutilier, 1992] proposed a system that 
sanctions inheritance across exceptional subclasses. It 
combines the ordering of system Z (the fiat version 
of system z+ where all the normality defaults have 
degree 1), with Brewka's [Brewka, 1989] notion of pre­
ferred subtheories. While system z+ assigns the same 
rank to any two worlds that falsify a default with pri­
ority z and no default with higher priority, Boutilier's 
proposal will make further comparisons. Considering 
only the defaults with priority z, if the set of defaults 
that are violated by one world is properly contained 
in the set of defaults violated by the other then the 
former world is preferred to the latter. This crite­
rion turns out to be inadequate when the set of de­
faults is not flat. Consider the penguin database, 
� = {b � f,p-+ -.f,p __,. b}. Suppose you add the 
default _!:.. w, "most of the creatures under considera­
tion have wings (with strength 1)". Table 3 shows the 
status of the defaults in the database with respect to 
two worlds w = bpfw and v = bpfw. In Boutilier's 
system, neither world is preferred to the other as each 
falsifies a default that the other verifies. Thus although 
the only difference between w and v is that w falsifies 
p -+ -.f while v falsifies 2... w, a default of greater 
degree, Boutilier's system is unable to distinguis!! �e 
two worlds. In contrast, the cp-conditions w >1 bpfw 
and v >1 bpfw forces the ii rank of v to be greater 
than the t. rank of w. This behavior is consistent with 
the conclusions (in both our system and Boutilier's 
system) in the simpler database {p---> -,f,.!... w}. 
Geffner's conditional entailment [Geffner, 1989) in­
duces a partial order on interpretations from the pri­
orities of the normality defaults. Among the defaults 
that are falsified by only one of the two worlds w and 
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v, if all those defaults that are of highest priorities are 
falsified by the same world, say w, then the world w is 
preferred to the world v. Formally, if F[w] and F[v] are 
the defaults that are falsified by w and v respectively, 
then w is preferred to v if and only if F[w] =I= F[v] and 
for every default in F[w] \ F[v] there exists a default in 
F[v] \F[w] that has a higher priority. Thus if the world 
w falsifies a proper subset of the defaults falsified by v 
then w is preferred to v. In our system, we impose a 
cp-condition quantified by the maximum degree of the 
defaults in F[v] \ F[w] when F[w] is a proper subset 
of F[v] and the worlds w and v satisfy the additional 
conditions that they agree on all the other defaults. 
Another difference is that unlike the numeric z+, pri­
orities in conditional entailment is a binary relation 
and in general gives rise to a partial order among de­
faults. If a set of defaults does not tolerate default d 
then at least one default in the set has a lower priority 
than d. This embodies the idea, that a default should 
have a higher priority than a composite argument to 
the contrary, which follows naturally from the inter­
pretation of a default r.p ---> 1/J as "if r.p is all we know 
then we are authorized to assert tj;, regardless all the 
other normality defaults in the database". As a result 
of this partial order among defaults it becomes non 
trivial to extend conditional entailment to take into 
account the degrees of quantified normality defaults. 
Pearl, motivated by the connection [Jaynes, 1979, 
Tribus, 1969] between maximizing entropy and min­
imizing dependencies, proposed [Pearl, 1988, p. 49 1) 
that the maximum entropy principle could be used 
to extract implicit independencies in default rea­
soning. Taking such an approach, Goldszmidt 
[Goldszmidt, 1992, Goldszmidt et al., 1990] proposed 
a system that ranks a world according to the weighted 
sum of the defaults falsified by the world. System z+ 
ranks a world according to the maximum priority de­
fault that is falsified by the world. By incorporating 
the cp-conditions, we have introduced some form of 
summation of the degrees of the falsified defaults. The 
cp-conditions are however only between worlds that 
agree on the other defaults in the database. 
In [Selman and Kautz, 1988) Selman and Kautz intro­
duced systems of Propositional Model Preference De­
faults where defaults of the form a ---> q, where a is 
a wff and q is a literal, are considered. Each default 
a ---> q induces a "ceteris paribum" preference between 
worlds that agree on all the atomic propositions with 
the possible exception of the proposition occurring in 
q. This extremely local (local to a single default) view 
prevents the system handling specificity properly. In 
contrast, in the R interpretation, a default induces a 
cp-condition between worlds only when they agree on 
all the other defaults in the database. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed an extension to System 
z+ that rectifies its main shortcoming by introduc­
ing cp-conditions between worlds that agree on all the 
other defaults in the database. We show that the addi­
tional constraints do not change the notion of consis­
tency of a defaults database in system z+. This means 
that the semi-tractable algorithm for determining con­
sistency may also be used to check for cp-consistency. 
It turns out that the main difference between our sys­
tem and many of the other default reasoning systems is 
that we take a more "global" view, placing constraints 
between worlds only when they agree on all the other 
defaults in the database. The advantages and disad­
vantages of this global view with respect to the other 
default reasoning systems remains to be fully evalu­
ated. 
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A Proofs 
Theorem 1 (Transitivity of cp-conditions) If 
w >-6' w' and w' 'r6" w", then w 'r6 w" where 
t5 = max(o',o"). 
Proof: Let!:::. be the defaults database, S' be the set of 
defaults that w and w' disagree on and S" be the that 
w' and w11 disagree on. Consider the set S = S' U S" 
and a default d. First we note that S' and S" are 
disjoint. If d E S', then by definition it is falsified by 
w and verified by w'. Verification of d by w' implies 
verification by w11 since the worlds w1 and w" agree 
outside of S". If d E S", then by definition it is falsified 
by w' and verified by w". In this case, falsification by 
w' implies falsification by w since the worlds w and w' 
agree outside of S'. Agreement by w and w' on A \ S' 
and by w' and w11 on !:::. \ S" also imply that w and 
w" agree on A\ S. Therefore w >-6 w" where 8 is the 
maximum degree ins i.e. max(8', o"). 0 
Lemma 1 (Minimization) Let A be a set of nor­
mality defaults and let x:1 and x:2 be two belief rank­
mgs. If x:(w) :::::: min(��:1(w),x:2(w)) then x:(,P) = 
min( K1 ( ,P ), K2 ( ,P )) . 
Proof: 
x:(¢) = min{K(w) lw f=,P} 
= min{min(��;l(w), 11:2(w)) I w f= ¢} 
= min(min{��:1(w) ( w f= q)}, 
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min{K2{w) I w f= ¢}) 
min{ Kt (if>), ��:2( ¢ )). 
0 
Theorem 3 (Minimization) Let � be a set of 
normality defaults and let K1 and K2 be two belief 
rankings. If K1 and ��:2 are cp-admissible then K = 
min(x:1, �>:2) is cp-admissible. 
Proof: First we will show that K is admissible. 
x:(<p A-.¢)= min(Kt(i.p A-.¢), K2(<p A-.¢)) 
(by lemma 1) 
� min(Kt(i.p /1. ¢) + 8, K2(<p /1. ¢) + 8) 
(by admissibility of K ;) 
= min(x:1(<p /1. ¢), K2(<p A¢))+ 8 
= K(tp /1. ¢) + 8 (by lemma 1). 
Next we show that all cp-conditions are satisfied. Let 
W ;>-5 II. 
K(w) = min(��:t(w), 1>:2(w)) 
2:: min(��:t(ll) + 6,�>:2(11) + c5) 
(by cp-admissibility of K;) 
= min(�>:1{11), K2(11)) + 8 
= x:(11) + 8. 
Therefore cp-admissibility is closed under mmtmtza­
tioo. 0 
Lemma 2 (Goldszmidt [Goldszmidt, 1992]) Let 
� be a set of normality defaults. If� is consistent then 
the defaults in � can be partitioned into �o, ... , �m 
such that all normality defaults d E �; is tolerated 
by � \ U�::� i . 2 Furthermore there is a sequence of 
sets of worlds 0; C 0 such that for all w E 0;, w 
verifies all the normality defaults in �; and w satisfies 
� \ u�::� i· 
Proof: This lemma follows directly from the proce­
dure for testing consistency [Goldszmidt, 1992, p .  25]. 
(See also corollary 2.5 there.) 0 
Lemma 3 (Consistency of CP-Conditions) The 
cp-conditions of any set � do not form a <-cycle; that 
is we cannot find a sequence of worlds such that wa <5o 
. .. <6,._1 Wn <6n Wn+1 = Wo for any n. 
Proof: (By contradiction) Suppose we can find 
such a sequence. Then for all i = 0, . . .  , n, w; <6, Wi+1 
implies that there exists a normality default d; such 
that w; verifies d; and w;+ 1 falsifies d;. In addition w; 
and w ;+1 agrees on all the other defaults. Therefore w; 
verifies d; and falsifies di for all j < i. In particular, 
Wn+l falsifies do but Wn+l = wo implies that Wn+l also 
verifies d0. This is a contradiction. 0 
Theorem 2 (Consistency Equivalence) A set of 
normality defaults � is consistent if and only if it is 
cp-consistent. 
2If i < 1 then U�:� Sj = 0. 
Proof: Since a cp-admissible ranking is also admis­
sible with respect to �. cp-consistency of � implies 
consistency of�. Next we assume that �is consistent 
and construct a belief ranking x: that is cp-admissible. 
For i = 0, ... , m, (by lemma 2) we construct �; and 
0; such that all normality defaults d E �; is tolerated 
by � \ U�::� i and for all w E 0;, w verifies all the 
normality defaults in �; and w satisfies � \ u�::� j. 
We also define Om+l to be 0 \ Uj=O Oj. Now we par­
tition each of the 0; 's. Defining w to be <-minimal in 
s if for all II E s, II -I w, we construct O;,j as follows. 
j-1 
O;,j = {w I w is <-minimal in 0; \ U 0;,1}. 
1=0 
This construction is possible as there are no <-cycles 
by lemma 3. Let 6i denote the largest degree of de­
faults in�;. We define the beliefranking ��:(w) for each 
w in !1;,j as 
K(w) = j x bi + max K{ll) + c5i'_1 ven,_, 
with the second term being 0 when i = 0. 
We will show that the belief ranking K is cp-admissible. 
First we consider worlds w E Oj and 11 E 0; where 
i < j. 
K(w) > max K(ll) + 8j_1 
v€0.;-t 
j-1 
> K(11) + I>s;. 
l=i 
Therefore if i < j 
��:( W) 2:: K( II) + Di (1) 
for all w E Oj and II E 0;. Given a normality default 
6 d = 'P-+ ¢ E �;,we have ��:(tp 1\ ¢) :::; K{ll) for some 
11 E 0; because 11 E !1; implies that 11 f= <p A ¢. If 
w f= <p 1\ -.¢ then w E Oi for some j > i. Then for all 
11 E !1; (by equation 1), 
x:(w) > K(11)+87 
> K(11)+6 
> K(<pA¢)+8. 
Therefore K is admissible. 
Let us consider the cp-condition w >6 11 with 11 E 0; 
and w E Oi . w and v agree on all defaults except for 
some d E �� which w falsifies and 11 verifies. Since w 
falsifies d we know that 1 < j. The agreement of w 
and 11 on the defaults in �m for m > 1 implies that 
i :::; j. Ifi < j then �>:(w) � K(v)+8 (by equation 1). If 
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i = j then w >6 11 implies that w E O;,x and 11 E O;,y 
for some x > y. Then 11:(w)- 11':(11) = (x- y)8i � 8. 
Therefore ll':(w) � 11':(11) + 6. This completes the proof. 
D 
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